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CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN WRONGDOERS-It
has long been a familiar maxim that as between joint tortfeasors contribution will not be enforced. A recent Penn-

sylvania case, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354,
(1928), presents a phase of this question upon which the
courts in the various jurisdictions are not in accord.
Gertrude Goldman, a minor, through her mother, Sarah
Goldman, and the latter in her own right, sued to recover
for injuries sustained by the former while a passenger
on a trolley owned and operated by one of the two joint
defendants, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., which collided with a wagon and team of horses owned by and under
the control of an employee of the other defendant, MitchellFletcher Co. Verdicts were rendered and judgments entered for both plaintiffs and against both defendants. Both
defendants appealed from the judgments, the American
Surety Co. becoming security for Mitchell-Fletcher Co. on
its appeal bond. Upon affirmance of the judgments,' the
Surety Co. paid them to the plaintiffs, and was subsequently
permitted by order of the trial court to intervene to assert
its right to subrogation and to mark the judgments to its
use. From this order, the Transit Co. appealed, contending
that the result of the action of the trial court would be to
bring about contribution between it and its joint tortfeasor.
The Supreme Court said that the only question really
involved was the right of the Surety Co. to be subrogated
in the judgments, but that to avoid further litigation, if
possible, the Court would pass on the question of the right
to contribution, which would become involved, should the
Surety Co. attempt to use the judgments to collect, not
only from its principal, but also from the Transit Co.
The Court held that, under the facts of the case 2 contribution between joint tort-feasors was not improper.
After a careful and exhaustive review of the English and
American authorities, the Court concluded that the general
rule that there can be no contribution between joint tortfeasors applies only where there has been an intentional
wrong or violation of law, or where the wrongdoer knows
or is presumed to know that the act was unlawful. Further,
it was held that the general rule does not apply to torts
which are the result of mere negligence.
1288 Pa. 102 (1927).
2
The court said, page 366, "There may be cases in which such
outcome should not be sanctioned; they will be disposed of in
the future when they are brought before us for determination."
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Upon the last proposition, as will be pointed out in fra,
the several courts are not in accord.
The general maxim, supra, that there can be no contribution between wrongdoers, had its origin in an English4
3
case, Merryweather v. Nixan. But as has well been said,
"Indeed this maxim is too much broken in upon at this
day to be called witht propriety a rule of law, so many
are the exceptions to it."
Modern decisions have limited the doctrine, that there
can be no contribution, to cases where the wrongdoers have
committed an intentional violation of the law or have done
acts which they knew or ought to have known were wrongful.5 To apply the general rule "we must look for personal
participation, personal culpability, personal knowledge, '"
or, as otherwise stated, "if there was knowledge that the
act was illegal, or if the circumstances were such as to
render ignorance of the illegality inexcusable", then there
can be no contribution. 7 Actual participation in the wrong
is not per se sufficient to deny contribution. It must also
appear that there was knowledge of the wrong or that
such knowledge could be presumed.
It must appear that
there was concert of action in the commission of the
wrong' and that the parties were in pari delicto.10
Accordingly, it has been held that there can be no
contribution between wrongdoers who join together in the
commission of an act involving moral turpitude, 1 or in the
commission of the following torts: libel, 12 fraud,'3 tres38 Term R. 186 (1799). The later English cases, limiting the
general rule, are discussed in the principal case, page 360.
4
Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859).
5
Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, page 490; 13
C. J. 830; Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, page 402, and cases there
cited; and see cases cited infra; also collection of authorities in
principal case.
t
Bailey v. Bussing, supra, note 4.
T
Cooley on Torts, vol. 1, 3rd ed., p. 259.
813 C. J. 830.
9In the principal case, there was no concert of action.
'0 Mayberry v. Northern Pac' Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79 (1907).
"Chicago Rys. Co. v. Conway, 219 Ill. App. 220 (1920); Horrabin v. Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549 (1924).
"Arnold v. Clifford, Fed. Cases, No. 555 (1835); Atkins v.
Johnson, 43 Vt. 78 (1870).
1
sBartle v. Nutt, 29 U. S. 184 (1830); Goldsborough v. Dorst,
9 Ill. App. 205 (1881); Tomerlin v. Krause, 278 S. W. (Texas) 501
(1926); Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324 (1889).
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5
nuisance 18 and sale of liquor in violapass, 14 conversion,
7
statute.'
tion of
The leading case in Pennsylvania falling under the
general rule is Boyer v. Bolender,'8 in which one of several
directors of an insurance company had paid off a judgment
recovered against them jointly for the fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of the company to their own
use. It was held he could not enforce contribution from
the others, because he had participated in the fraud and
knew or must be presumed to have known that he was
doing an unlawful act.
In those cases where the general rule applies the reason
the law refuses contribution, "is that the wrongdoers may
be intimidated from committing the wrong, by the danger
of each being made responsible for all the consequences; a
reason which does not apply to torts or injuries arising
from mistakes or accidents."1U
But there are many cases in which contribution has
been enforced between wrongdoers held jointly responsible
for a tort to a third person. A concise summary of such
cases is found in the following words, "In cases of quasitorts only, not involving any moral turpitude or any personal fault, or where the acts are not obviously unlawful,
or the parties are not presumed to have known they were
doing any wrong, or where their liability is by implication
of law merely, then contribution will be enforced."'' 2 Again,
if there is "only a liability in the eye of the law, growing
21
out of a mere relation to the perpetrator of the wrong," L
or, "where the parties are acting under the supposition of
the entire innocence and propriety of the act and the tort
is merely one by construction, or inference of law, ' 2 2 there
can be contribution.

14Percy v. Clary, 32 Md. 245 (1870); Avery v. Halsey, 31 Mass.
174 (1833); Sutton v. Morris, 102 Ky. 611 (1898).
35 Rhen v. White, 40 Tenn. 121 (1859); Davis v. Gelhans, 44 Ohio
69 (1886); Sharp v. Coll, 69 Neb. 72 (1903).
6
Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 111 S. C. 140 (1918).
T
' Wanack v. Michels, 215 I1. 87 (1905); Johnson v. Torpy, 35
Neb. 604 (1892).
"'Supra, note 13.
'9 Thweatt's Admr. v. Jones, 1 Randolph (Va.) 328. The reason
is one of public policy. Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, page 406;
12 Harv. L. R. 176.
"013 C. J. 829, and cases there cited.
21
Bailey v. Bussing, supra, note 4.
22
Story on Partnership, page 220.
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The following excellent statement of the principles
governing cases enforcing contribution has been made by
an eminent writer,2 3 "As between parties who are legally
responsible for a wrong, not because they authorized or
actually participated in its commission, but because of
their relation to the actual wrongdoer, * * * * contribution

is enforced.24 The same is true when, although the parties authorized or actually participated in such an infringement of another's legal right as constitutes a tort,
they acted in good faith and are not chargeable with
knowledge that their action was wrongful."2
We now reach the question upon which the several
courts are not in accord, viz, will contribution be enforced
between wrongdoers whose liability arose out of mere
negligence? Some jurisdictions permit contribution, 2 apparently on the theory, that while the wrongdoers may
have participated in the concurrent negligence, the tort is
negative in character and is not a wrong committed intentionally or with knowledge of its wrongfulness, elements essential to the application of the general rule denying contribution. On the other hand, many jurisdictions
23Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, page 403.
where the wrongdoers were liable not because of their
own tort, but because of the tort of their common servant, Horbach's Admr. v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me.
449 (1918); or because of the joint tort of their respective servants,
Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870), where a
traveler was injured as a result of negligence in joint maintenance
of a bridge; also the principal case, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher
Co., 292 Pa. 354 (1928); and on similar facts, Ellis v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 167 Wisc. 392 (1918); contra, semble, Norfolk S. R. C0. v.
Beskin, 140 Va, 744 (1924); Public Service Ry. Co. v. Mattencci,
143 Atl. (N. J.) 221 (1928).
25
Vandiver v. Pollak, 97 Ala. 467 (1893); Farwell v. Becker,
129 Ill. 261 (1889); Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 287 (1852);
Smith v. Ayrault, 71 Mich. 475 (1888); First Nat. Bank v. Avery
Planter Co., 69 Neb. 329 (1903); Schappel v. First Nat. Bank, 80
Neb. 708 (1908); Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio 203 (1853).
2
6Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109 (1887); Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 1-00 Minn. 79 (1907); Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn.
388 (1926); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449 (1918); Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wisc. 591 (1923); Ellis v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 167 Wisc.
392 (1918), facts similar to principal case; Nickerson v. Wheeler,
118 Mass. 295 (1875); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa.
218 (1870); see also principal case, page 364, and cases there cited.
24E. g.,

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
refuse contribution between mere negligent wrongdoers,2
apparently because both are in pari delicto and their conduct, though negative, is morally, as well as legally, culpable.
But many of the cases enforcing contribution where
the wrong was- mere negligence fall in that class of cases,
described above by Prof. Woodward, where the wrongdoers are held liable, not because they authorized or actually participated in the negligent conduct, but because
of their relation to the actual wrongdoer. For instance, in
Hobbs v. Hurley,28 A and B borrowed an automobile and
their chauffeur (their common servant) negligently injured a third person. It was held that A, who paid the
damages, could enforce contribution from B. Again, automobiles, owned by A and B and driven by their respective employees, X and Y, collide by reason of the
concurrent negligence of the latter and a third person is
injured. Contribution has been enforced..29 But in both
these cases, A and B are held liable, not because of their
own participation in the wrong, but because of their relation to the person or persons who actually committed
the tort. The liability of A and B in each case is free
from personal fault and is merely by implication of law.
In such cases then -contribution should be enforced on
those principles which :as outlined hereinabove, justify
a departure from the general rule. Such cases should
not be authority for the statement that there can be contribution where the wrong is mere negligence.
The facts of the principal case, Goldman v. MitchellFletcher Co., are like those in the latter of the above illustrations.3 0 The case, therefore, should be authority
-7Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 196 U. S. 217
(1905); Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Co., 107 Fed. 874
(1901); Forsythe v. Los Angeles R. Co., 149 Cal. 569 (1906); Gregg
v. Page Belting Co., 69 N. H. 247 (1897); Andrews v. Murray, 3 t
Barb. (N. Y.) 354 (1861); Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Nass, 94 Tex.
255 (1900); Walton v. Miller, 109 Va. 210 (1909); Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505 (1911); Doles v. "Seaboard, etc., R. Co., 160 N. C.
318; Wise v. Berger, 103 Conn. 29 (1925); 111. Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445 (1916); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co.,
131 Oki. 25 (1928); Norfolk, etc., Co. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744 (1924),
same facts as principal case; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Mattencci,
143 Atl. (N. J.) 221 (1928), semble.
2SSupra, note 26.
29
See cases cited in Note 30, infra.
'0Ellis v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., supra, note 26; indeed, most
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for the principle that there can be contribution between
wrongdoers who are liable by implication of law and free
from personal fault and is not a strong authority for the
rule that there can be contribution where the wrong is
mere negligence. It is submitted that in the principal case
and others with similar facts, contribution is permitted
because of the technical nature of the liability of the
wrongdoers, and not because of the character of the
wrong committed. This contention is strengthened by
the Court's statement s 'L in the principal case that "the
responsibility of the defendants grows out of the rule
respondeat superior," and again by the court's admonition 2
that the decision in the case rests upon its particular
facts.
But if two vehicles, owned and operated respectively
by A and B, collide by reason of their concurrent negligence, and contribution for the resulting injuries to a third
person is enforced, then the liability is not by implication
of law, but because of active participation, and contribution is permitted because of the nature of the wrong, i. e.,
a wrong not intentionally done.3
There is another class of cases where one wrongdoer may recover indemnity, i. e., may recover from another wrongdoer the entire amount which he has been
compelled to pay the injured victim of the tort. This is
to be distinguished from contribution, which, when allowed, permits the recovery of merely a proportionate share
of the liability. It has been said that the rules governing
contribution between 8wrongdoers apply, mutatis mutandis,
to cases of indemnity.
Thus, whether an agent who has committed a tort
under the direction of his principal may recover indemnity
from the principal depends upon the moral responsibility
of the agent. Suppose the agent, at the direction of his
principal, innocently makes a false statement of fact, the
falsity of which is known to the principal, and is cornof the cases cited in note 26, supra, have such facts.

But, see contra,

on similar facts, Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co. v. Beskin, and Public Service Ry. Co. v. Mattencci, supra, note 27.
3'P. 359.
92p. 365.
8
8For a case which, upon these facts, enforced contribution, see
Mitchell v. Raymond, supra, note 26. No similar case was discovered in a careful search of the authorities.
3
'Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, p. 406.
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pelled to pay damages to the injured person. It will be
noted that there is only one wrongdoer who consciously
or intentionally commits a tort. The agent is made liable
largely because of the conscious wrong of another. The
agent is not in equal fault and should be fully indemnified
by the one morally culpable. Where contribution was
denied, as seen supra, both wrongdoers were in pari delicto
and were both conscious participants. Where contribution
was permitted, neither was intentionally a wrongdoer and
should bear the liability proportionately.
Accordingly, if an agent commited a tort under the
direction of his principal and knew or ought to have known
that his act was wrongful, he will not be allowed indemnity,35 nor would he be allowed contribution."6 But if he
acted in good faith and without any intention of violating
another's rights, he may shift the consequences to his principal, where as between the3 two it should justly fall, and
he may recover indemnity. "
Again, while one has actually authorized the commission of a tort by his agent or servant is obviously entitled neither to indemnity nor contribution one who has
not authorized a wrongful act, but is held liable to the
person injured merely because of his relationship to the
who committed it, will be allowed to
agent or servant
38
seek indemnity.
Indemnity is frequently sought where the relation of
master and servant or principal and agent does not exist,
but where, nevertheless, as between the tort-feasors, one is
primarily responsible for the wrong and ought to bear the
consequences. The principle, allowing indemntiy in such
cases, has been stated thus: "As between two negligent
parties, if the negligence of one was merely passive or was
such as only to produce the occasion, and the other negligent party was the active perpetrator of the wrong, the
3

5Nelson v. Cork, 17 Ill. 443 (1856); Sutton v. Morris, 102 Ky.
611 (1898); Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 142 (1819); Cul-

mer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129 (1896).
36

See cases cited in notes 5-10, supra.
Betts v. Gibbons, 2 Ad. & E. (Eng.) 57 (1834); Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633 (1855); Gower v. Emory, 18 Me. 79 (1841); Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444 (1903).
38
Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394, 398 (1917); Bradley v.
Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 (1908); Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Jossey, 105
Ga. 271 (1898); Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874);
87

Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170 (1900); Lane v. Fenn, 65 Misc. (N. Y.)
336 (1909); 39 C. J. 1313.
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former may recover over against the latter."'3' Or, in other
words, "One who has been held legally liable for the personal neglect of another is entitled to indemnity from the
latter * * * * and the right to indemnity does not depend
upon the fact that the defendant owed the plaintiff (seeking indemnity) a special or particular duty not to. be negligent. The right to indemnity stands upon the principle
that every one is responsible for the consequences of his
own negligence, and, if another person has been compelled
to pay the damages which ought to have been' 40 paid by the
wrongdoer, they may be recovered from him.
Accordingly, where a sidewalk is negligently maintained, both the property owner and the municipality are legally responsible to the person injured, but the primary duty
rests upon the property owner. If the municipality is compelled to pay damages, it may recover the amount so paid
A property owner who has
from the property owner."
been compelled to pay damages for a defect in the sidewalk, can recover indemnity from a gas company whose
negligence caused the defect. 4 2 Similarly, a landlord who
has been held liable for a defect in the premises, may seek
from the tenant upon whom the primary duty
indemnity
43
rested.
44
Attention is called to a recent Pennsylvania statute,
the provisions of which are useful to defendants in tort
actions, who may later be able to seek contribution or indemnity from some other wrongdoer. The Act permits a
defendant to have joined, as additional defendants, persons
whom he alleges are liable over to him or jointly or severally liable with him. The Act has recently been construed and held constitutional, and procedure for its proper
use suggested by the Supreme Court.4 5

'9 Austin, Etc., Ry. Co. v. Faust, 133 S. W. (Tex.) 449, 453 (1911);
Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632 (1919).
400ceanic Co. v. Compania Transalantica, 134 N. Y. 461 (1892).
41
Phila. v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183 (1929); Pittsburgh v. Reed,
74 Pa. Super. 444 (1920); and many cases cited in 31 C. J. 456.
42
Orth v. Consumers Gas Co., 280 Pa. 118 (1924); accord, on
nearly similar facts, Phila. Co. v. Traction Co., 165 Pa. 456 (1895);
Reymer v. Consolidated Ice Co., 67 Pa. Super. 468 (1917).
43Hanley v. Ryan, 87 Pa. Super. 6 (1926); San Antonio v. Smith,
94 Tex. 266 (1900).
a4Act of April 10, 1929, P. L. 479.
"3Vinnacombe v. Phila., 297 Pa. 564 (1929). The court said the
Act does not affect the plaintiffs in such suits. Where there are
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Finally, if one wrongdoer is entitled either to contribution or to indemnity, his proper remedy is an action of
assumpsit on the theory that the duty of the other wrongdoer is quasi-contractual.40 If contribution is sought from
several persons, equity has jurisdiction
on the ground of
47
prevention of multiplicity of suits.
Fred S. Reese
ARSON AS AFFECTED BY THE ACT OF APRIL
25, 1929, P. L. 767-The act of April 25th, 1929,1 is entitled,
in part, "An act to define arson": the first section of the
act declares that any person who does certain things "shall
be guilty of the felony of arson"; the sixth section of the
act repeals section one hundred and thirty-seven of the act
of March 31st, 1860,2 by which arson was previously defined.
The act makes important changes in the law of arson.
These changes may be exposited by considering: (1) The
nature of the thing affected; (2) The ownership of the
thing affected; (3) The act done to the thing affected; (4)
The mental attitude of the actor.
Arson at common law was defined as the malicious and
wilful (or voluntary) burning of the house of another.3
The term "house" was interpreted as meaning dwelling
house, and included buildings4 located within what was
then known as the "curtilage."
The act of March 31st, 1860, provided that the burning
of any of the following three classes of buildings should
constitute arson: (1) Any factory, mill, or dwelling
two or more wrongdoers, as to whether plaintiff may sue them jointly
or must sue them separately, as to effect of judgment against one,
and similar questions, see Hill v. American Stores Co., 80 Pa. Super.
338 (1923); Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394 (1917).
4
1Phila. v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183 (1929). Assumpsit was successfully used, without objection, in Armstrong County v. Clarion
County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870); and in Horbach's Adnmr. v. Elder, 18 Pa.

33 (1851).
'7Steigerwalt v. Smeych et al., 9 Pa. Super. 363 (1899). In Boyer
v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324 (1889), one wrongdoer sued in equity to
recover contribution fronm nine other wrongdoers.
' P. L, 767.
2P. L. 382.
35
45

C. J. 539; Trickett's Crim. L. p. 164.

C. J. 547.

